Strategic Choice and International Relations [electronic resource]

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자료유형	e-Book
서명/저자사항	Strategic Choice and International Relations [electronic resource] / David A. Lake, Robert Powell.
개인저자	Lake, David A., editor. Powell, Robert, editor.
발행사항	Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [2020].
형태사항	1 online resource : 2 tables 2 line illus.
ISBN	0691213097 9780691213095
기타표준부호	10.1515/9780691213095doi
내용주기	Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One. International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach -- Chapter Two. Actors and Preferences in International Relations -- Chapter Three. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics -- Chapter Four. Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice -- Chapter Five. The Governance Problem in International Relations -- Chapter Six. Evolution, Choice, and International Change -- Chapter Seven. The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation -- References -- About the Authors -- Name Index -- General Index
요약	The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals. This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions. Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers.
일반주제명	Axelrod, Robert. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Chicken Game. Depew, David J. Fearon, James. Frieden, Jeffry. Hirshleifer, Jack. Keohane, Robert O. Lake, David. Lamarckism. Morrow, James. Rogowski, Ronald. aggregation of preferences. constructivist theories. deterrents: alliances as. ecology, organizational. hegemonic stability theory. linkage in bargaining. mathematical model. multiple-veto systems. reversion point. scale of units. screening. POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. International relations. Strategic planning.
분류기호(DDC)	327.101b
언어	In English.
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